Buffalo Law Review
Volume 7

Number 1

Article 61

10-1-1957

Criminal Law—Parole Violation
Robert Lane

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Lane, Criminal Law—Parole Violation, 7 Buff. L. Rev. 132 (1957).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol7/iss1/61

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
involving coram nobis where both the nature of the writ and its emergency application are brought into dispute.
Parole Violation
The Correction Law, section 219, provides that if any prisoner, who has
been paroled from a state prison commits and is convicted of a crime in another
state, which if committed in this state would be a felony, he shall upon his
return to this state be confined in prison to serve the remaining portion of the
maximum sentence from which he had been paroled.69 The Court held (4-3) in
People ex rel. Watkins v. Murphy,7 0 a habeas corpus proceeding, that section 218
of the Correction Law, 71 which provides that a parole board should declare a
prisoner to be delinquent whenever there is reasonable cause to believe he has
violated his parole, does not terminate the prisoner's parole so as to immunize him
from the penalty imposed by section 219.
The defendant, a parolee from a New York prison, had been declared
delinquent from such parole in accordance with section 218. A month later he
was arrested, convicted and sentenced to a term in a Texas prison for the
commission of a crime, which all of the Court agreed would be a felony if
committed in this state. Upon being released from the Texas prison, he was
returned to New York to serve the remainder of the maximum sentence from
which he had originally been paroled.
When a prisoner is paroled, he is in fact being permitted to serve part of
his sentence outside of prison.7 2 As of the time he is declared delinquent from
this parole however, his sentence stops and the "time owed shall date from such
73
delinquency."
The dissenting judges upheld the defendant's contention that he did not
commit the crime while he was on parole for he had previously been declared
delinquent thereby terminating his parole. As soon as the parole is declared
delinquent, he assumes the status of an escaped convict.74 Therefore, since he
is no longer lawfully out of prison, he cannot be said to be a charge of the Board
of Parole;75 nor can he be said to be on parole within the meaning of section 219
if he is no longer on parole within the meaning of section 218.
The majority however views the parolee as a prisoner on parole and until
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Dote v. Martin, 294 N.Y. 330, 62 N.E.2d 217 (1945).

COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
he is returned to prison, he is still subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of
Parole70 and therefore subject to the penalty imposed by section 219.
Although as the dissent points out, the defendant had even been arrested in
Texas by virtue of a New York warrant for violation of his parole and subsequently released because no one from the New York Board of Parole appeared
to take him into custody, prior to the commission of the crime in Texas, he should
still be considered to be on parole within the meaning of section 219. A contrary
holding would favor the parolee, who had previously violated his parole in
addition to committing a felony, over the parolee, who had not violated his
parole before committing the same crime.
Surrender Of Prisoner Not Commutation Of Sentence
Surrender by the Governor of'the State of New York of a prisoner to be
tried for a crime in another state does not amount to a commutation of the New
York sentence although the time spent in the other state's prison is deducted from
the New York sentence.
It was so held in People ex rel. Reynolds v. Martin77 concerning a prisoner
who was under sentence of from twenty years to life for second degree murder.
Shortly thereafter, the State of Pennsylvania applied to the Governor of this state
for surrender of the prisoner to be tried for first degree murder. (This surrender
should be within a reasonable time after the commission of the crime and is based
upon reciprocal comity.) 78 The Governor agreed, provided that if the prisoner
was acquitted or received a lesser sentence than the New York sentence, he was
to be returned to New York to finish his term here; but if convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment or execution he was to be left in the custody of the State of
Pennsylvania.
The prisoner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, fifteen years
later the Governor of Pennsylvania commuted the sentence to fifteen years and
one month, also providing for the prisoner's return to New York. Upon his return
to Attica State Prison a writ of habeas corpus was sued out. The writ was dismissed
79
and upon appeal the dismissal was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
The Court of Appeals reasoned, in affirming, that the Governor of New
York had not commuted the sentence since this power must be exercised formally
according to the constitution and implementing statutes8 0 Also, the Governor's
76. See note 72 supra.
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